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University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Business, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyze a sample of 1,832 individuals who responded to six randomly generated lottery 
questions that differ with respect to chance, prize and the timing of the draw. Using a model that explicitly 
allows for consumption smoothing, we obtain an estimate of relative risk aversion of 82. Instead, assuming 
consumption to be immediate gives an estimate of 2, close to what is traditionally reported, while a model of full 
asset integration gives estimates higher by several orders of magnitude. Our results show that estimated risk 
aversion is sensitive to the assumptions made with respect to the consumption profile and that it is possible to 
determine the level of asset integration endogenously. The average subjective time discount rate, which includes 
a preference for the present, equals 6% per month. It is found that both parameters vary strongly over 
individuals and that the variation can be explained by income, age, gender, and entrepreneurship, consistent with 
the majority of previous evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
In standard economic analysis, decisions that involve a risk or a time dimension are 
traditionally analyzed separately within the framework of expected- or discounted-utility 
respectively. Many choice situations, however, concern both dimensions. For example, if we 
observe an investor who is reluctant to invest in a project promising large but risky long run 
profits, should we infer from this that he is risk averse, or should we ascribe his reluctance to 
impatience, preferring consumption now to later? Similarly, are students who quit school 
early impatient, or are they more inclined to take the current, more certain wage offer because 
they are more risk averse? 
The general problem that both risk and time preferences can affect choices simultaneously 
has been acknowledged for some time in the macro-economic literature, where both the 
discount rate and relative risk aversion play a role in the estimation of the Euler equation of 
aggregate consumption. The separation of risk and time preferences has received 
considerable attention in this field, both theoretically and empirically (Kreps and Porteus, 
1978; Hall, 1988; Epstein and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1990). In the micro-econometric literature 
that is concerned with the elicitation of these preferences at the individual level, however, 
risk and time dimensions are almost always treated separately (see for instance Barsky et al., 
1997; Harrison et al., 2005). In order to see how this can affect the results, consider the 
willingness to pay for a simple lottery. In this context risk aversion is often estimated without 
acknowledging that the potential gains from such a lottery, in case they are big, will not be 
spent immediately but will be spread out over time. Hence, the value of the lottery-prize, and 
consequently the lottery, will differ between patient- and impatient-individuals, making time 
preferences a confounding factor. Similarly, when estimating time preferences the uncertainty 
associated with delay, and also utility curvature, is often neglected, resulting in an estimation 
bias (Frederick et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2008). 
The aim of the present paper is to show how, under plausible assumptions on consumption, 
time preferences affect risky decision making. To illustrate this, we model the willingness to 
pay for a lottery in the discounted expected utility framework, acknowledging that a large 
prize will not be consumed immediately but spread optimally over time. Assuming that 
individuals are borrowing constrained, consumption will be spread over a finite period that is 
endogenously determined. This model forms an intermediate case between two extremes: (i) 
no smoothing, current consumption equals current income, and (ii) no capital constraints. In 
the first case only current consumption is affected, while in the second the prize is integrated 
into total wealth. In that case time preferences determine the shape of the optimal profile, but 
not the curvature of the utility of wealth, yielding time preferences irrelevant. We will see 
that these assumptions have a great influence on the estimated risk aversion because of their 
differing levels of asset integration. The novelty of our model is that the level of asset 
integration is endogenously determined and that risk and time preferences are estimated 
jointly.
To estimate the model, we use a large survey in which we ask for the willingness to pay for 
different lotteries that differ with respect to chance, prize, and timing of the draw. Using our 
model these data allow for the joint estimation of the coefficients of relative risk aversion and 
the time preference rate. The variation in these parameters can be explained by individual 
characteristics such as income, age, education, gender, intensity of religious participation, 
entrepreneurship, and other variables. In all estimated equations most effects are significant, 
plausible and consistent with the findings in most studies that relate risk and time preferences 
to demographics. 
According to our knowledge there are only a few studies that simultaneously report 
estimates on risk and time preferences at the micro level. Even if these studies have data on 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
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choices with a risk and/or a time dimension, the risk and time effects are analyzed separately 
(Barsky et al., 1997; Anderhub et al., 2001; Eckel et al., 2005; Harrison et al., 2005). The 
only exception is the study by Andersen et al. (2008), who simultaneously estimate risk and 
time preferences for a representative sample of the Danish population. Contrary to our model 
however, these authors do not model how the prize is consumed. 
The structure of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 gives more background on the 
estimation of risk and time preferences in the literature. The model is outlined in section 3, 
followed by a description of the data in section 4. Section 5 presents an analysis of the survey 
results assuming homogeneity in preferences, an assumption that is dropped in section 6. 
Section 7 concludes, followed by appendices A and B that give derivations of the key 
mathematical equations in the paper.
2. Background 
Decisions under uncertainty are, traditionally, described by the Von Neumann - Morgenstern 
expected utility (EU) model, which defines the utility to be maximized as the expectation of 
the utilities of the random alternatives. The expected utility model is not beyond discussion. 
We refer to Allais (1953), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
and Rabin and Thaler (2001) for critique and alternatives. An important ingredient in this 
framework is the specification of the utility function. The most popular one-parameter 
specification is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function defined by 
, where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is constant and given 
by . Empirical estimates of this parameter vary greatly at the micro level, and they seem to 
be particularly sensitive to the magnitude of the stakes and whether outcomes are modeled in 
terms of final wealth or in terms of gains and losses (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2002; 
Meyer and Meyer, 2005; Wakker, 2005). Most studies of risk aversion look at gambles, at 
decisions on the choice of risky assets in portfolios, or at the choice of insurance policies.
1( ) / 1u y y   

1
Another important source of individual risk aversion estimates are experiments.2 Finally, 
measures of risk aversion obtained through hypothetical questions have also been used to 
explain choice under uncertainty.3
A very similar model, the discounted utility model (DU), describes the problem of 
decisions over time where utilities at different moments of time are exponentially weighted 
by a subjective time discount rate  . Also this model is not beyond discussion, as is clear 
from the extensive list of anomalies that have been reported in the literature (e.g. 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991; Frederick et al., 2002). The empirical estimates of the 
parameter  vary a great deal. They are mostly derived from consumption-smoothing 
models, experimental choice situations, or hypothetical questions.

4 In the first type of model, 
identification of time preferences relies on the assumption that agents have access to perfect 
capital markets and that they smooth their consumption according to their rate of time 
preferences. Data on an individual’s consumption flow serve to assess this rate. Most studies 
of time preference, however, exploit the last two types of data. Here, time preferences are 
1 Two studies that look at gambles are Jullien and Salanié (2000) and Beetsma and Schotman (2001). Pållson 
(1996) looks at portfolio composition, and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) examine insurance choices. 
2 Examples are Anderhub et al. (2001), Holt and Laury (2002) and Harrison et al. (2005). 
3 Examples of this approach can be found in Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), Hartog et al. (2002), 
Guiso and Paiella (2006) and Dohmen et al. (2006). 
4 For example Trostel and Taylor (2001) estimate time preferences using a consumption smoothing model 
while Benzion et al. (1989), Coller and Williams (1999), Read (2001), Anderhub et al. (2001) and Harrison et 
al. (2002) use experiments and Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers and van Soest (1999), Lazaro et al. (2001) and 
Kapteyn and Teppa (2003) use hypothetical questions. 
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identified by looking at individual choices between income streams. Then restrictions have to 
be put on either the possibilities of intertemporal arbitrage or the subjects’ optimizing 
behavior. The implicit assumption in most studies seems to be that individuals ignore the 
possibility of intertemporal arbitrage either because they are unaware of it or because they are 
unable to exploit it (Pender, 1996).5 The fact that imputed interest rates do not converge to 
market interest rates justifies this assumption (Frederick et al., p. 381). Estimated discount 
rates per year vary from 10% to well over 100% (Frederick et al., pp. 377-381). 
As said before, the only study integrating both risk and time preferences at the individual 
level is Andersen et al. (2008).6 Using responses to a list of (binary) choices between either 
lotteries or payoff profiles, these authors simultaneously identify risk and time preferences. 
Under the assumption of EU (over money gains) their risk aversion task pins down utility 
curvature, which is then used to obtain an estimate of the subjective time discount rate 
corrected for concavity of the utility function. The correction decreases the estimates, 
confirming the existence of an upward bias when utility curvature is neglected. 
In their setup, risk aversion affects the estimated rate of time preference (through utility 
curvature), but not the other way round. Hence, the estimated level of risk aversion does not 
control for the fact that the consumption of the lottery gains will be spread over time. Since 
the stakes are relatively low in their study, this is unlikely to pose a big problem because 
consumption can be assumed to be approximately immediate in that case. When the stakes 
are large however, time preferences will also affect how outcomes are evaluated. In that 
setting also the consumption profile has to be modeled. This will be illustrated by the simple 
model in the next section. 
3. The Model 
In this section we consider the value of a lottery that is, the maximum amount an individual is 
willing to pay for a ticket for a specific lottery. First we will describe this problem using the 
standard expected utility model without a time dimension. Then we view the problem in an 
intertemporal framework. The standard model turns out to be a special case where individuals 
face no liquidity constraints, while the model that does not include wealth corresponds to the 
case where consumption is immediate and borrowing and saving are not possible. Then we 
present an intermediate case where saving is possible, but borrowing is not, and see that time 
preferences become an additional parameter in the problem. 
Let us consider an individual with non-stochastic monthly income y , and let W denote the
net present value of this income stream. Suppose that he gets an offer to participate in a 
lottery that will give prize  with chance  . Moreover, let the price of a ticket be denoted 
by a  and the individual’s utility of wealth be denoted by . Then, the expected utility of 
accepting the offer will be (1 . The maximum amount an 
individual is prepared to pay for taking part in the lottery is the amount , which solves the 
indifference equation 
Z
( )U 
) ( )aU W  U W a Z  ( )
A
       1 U W A U W A Z U W       . (1) 
We call  the value of the lottery or the reservation price. This is the traditional, timeless, 
(normative) framework that is used to model decisions under risk. In this model all money 
A
5 Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002) form notable exceptions. In these studies of time 
preference the authors explicitly take censoring due to market interest rates into account. 
6 Technically, studies that estimate the reference wealth level (Heinemann, 2007; Harrison et al., 2007) can be 
thought to estimate a reduced form of a model that includes a time dimension. Since these studies do not 
explicitly model the time dimension, we do not consider them in the class of models simultaneously integrating 
risk and time preferences. 
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involved in the lottery is integrated into lifetime wealth, and the individuals’ risk aversion is 
determined by the degree of concavity of utility with respect to wealth.7
Now we view the same problem within an intertemporal framework. We assume a 
discounted expected utility model in continuous time with a CRRA instantaneous utility 
function  defined over present consumption( )u   c t , and (subjective) discount rate . The 
utility of a consumption profile c  is then given by 

  
0
t
t
e u c t dt
 
 .
If there are no liquidity constraints, the individual has preferences only over present 
discounted sums of money. This is true because, through intertemporal arbitrage, all income 
streams with the same discounted value give rise to the same consumption possibilities. 
Hence, in this setting time preferences do not matter and additional money is simply 
integrated with wealth. The utility of an amount of wealth W  is given by the instantaneous 
utility function  u W .8 Hence, the indifference equation under the assumption of full 
consumption smoothing is 
       1 u W A u W A Z u W       . (2) 
Thus, the standard expected utility model defined over wealth can be interpreted as 
describing decision under risk under full consumption smoothing. 
If we now suppose the other extreme (i.e. that it is not possible to borrow or save) then 
current income equals current consumption. In that case only the present (month) is affected, 
with consumption equal to y A  if the prize is won, and y  otherwise. We will call 
this the immediate model. The indifference equation for this model is 
Z  A
       1 u y A u y A Z u y       . (3) 
In both cases the level of risk aversion is determined by the curvature of the instantaneous 
utility function. Let this function be defined over changes-in-wealth x, plus some reference 
level , that is R  u R x . The standard model then corresponds to the case where the 
reference point is wealth (i.e. R ), whereas in the immediate model it is present 
consumption (i.e. R ). This difference has serious repercussions for the inferred level of 
relative risk aversion. Various authors have noted that the estimate of relative risk aversion is 
very sensitive to the level of the outcome dimension. Wakker (2008), for example, states that 
the CRRA family is not invariant to the level of inputs, and Meyer and Meyer (2005) show 
more specifically that the inferred measure of relative risk aversion increases (almost) 
proportionally with the assumed origin of the input scale. A simple numerical example 
illustrates this. 
W
y
Consider an individual earning y=500 a month, with corresponding lifetime wealth 
W=200.000. Say this individual is prepared to pay  for a lottery with 100A
   , .5,1000Z  . Then, if we assume the immediate model holds (R ), we would 
infer that , while we get an estimate of  if the standard model (R W )
holds! More generally, if we gradually increase R={500, 1000, 5000, 10000, 100.000, 
W
ˆ 4 	 ˆ 1385 	 
7 There is a debate in the literature on whether the expected utility model presupposes that outcomes are 
defined in terms of final wealth or not. Both Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and Rubinstein (2006) argue that it is not, 
and conclude that Rabin’s (2000) critique of the model does not necessarily hold because of this. In a recent 
working paper Wakker (2005) argues that even though the fundamental axioms of EU do not say anything about 
the nature of outcomes, the model only has normative content if defined over final wealth. Hence, in this paper 
we assume the expected utility model to be defined over wealth. 
8 We refer to Schechter (2007) for the technical details on the intertemporal optimization problem. 
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200.000}, we find ={4, 7.5, 35, 70, 693, 1385} respectively.ˆ 9 Hence, the assumptions made 
about the consumption profile are of crucial importance. A practical example is provided by 
Schechter (2007), who reports estimates of relative risk aversion close to 2 if the reference 
level is daily consumption and estimates of over 2000 if outcomes are added to lifetime 
wealth.
The intuition behind this is that if the consumption of a given amount of small money is 
spread over the entire lifetime, the effect on each period’s consumption will be negligible. To 
generate appreciable risk aversion, the per-period utility function must then be very concave, 
translating in a high estimate of relative risk aversion. Rabin (2000) shows that this has 
bizarre implications for high stake risk aversion. If consumption is confined to the present 
period, however, the relative impact of the same amount of money is much larger. In that 
case mild curvature can generate same small stake risk aversion, circumventing Rabin’s 
extreme implication. Indeed, most studies that find appreciable small stake risk aversion do 
not integrate outcomes with wealth and, thereby, find moderate values of isk aversion, 
mostly below 10. Rabin and Thaler (2002) suggest that wealth is often neglected not only 
because it is hard to measure, but also because “it would make referees worry” if the extreme 
measures of relative risk aversion were reported that are implied by these studies had 
outcomes been added to wealth (see for example Holt and Laury 2002; Harrison et al. 2005; 
Dohmen et al. 2006). 
An intermediate case: asset integration endogenously determined. 
The assumptions underlying both previous models may be seen as extreme positions. If we 
take an intermediate position, as we do in this paper, where saving is assumed possible while 
borrowing is not, the consumption of the prize will be spread over time, albeit over a finite 
period. In that case the outcomes affect future periods, but they are not fully integrated into 
lifetime wealth as in the standard model. To see this, we consider the same model with a 
borrowing constraint. If it is not possible to borrow and individuals are assumed to be 
impatient (i.e. ), then baseline consumption is equal to monthly income (i.e. 0 

   c t y t y  ). Now we will make some specific assumptions about the timing of the 
income flows associated with the lo tery. These assumptions are made for simplicity. A 
different specification will yield different quantitative results, but they do not affect the main 
qualitative message of the paper that if one introduces capital restrictions, both risk and time 
preferences operate simultaneously and the level of asset integration becomes endogenous. 
Let the lottery ticket be bought at price A , the cost of which is assumed to be spread evenly 
during the period [0  before the draw of the lottery, which occurs later, at time . Hence, 
in the period before the draw of the lottery, consumption is reduced to (
, ] 
Ay  ). If the prize, 
an amount Z , has been won, it becomes available at time   and may be gradually spent over 
the period in the future  ,  . Let P t  denote the fraction of Z  that is spent up to time 
 and let  denote its derivative. Trivially, we may define 
 
( , )t  ( )p t   0p t   for 
. We have the constraints 0 t  
 and  
0
1p t dt

   0p t   for all . (4) 0t 

9 For large wealth levels it can be shown that  log 1ˆ 1
A
W


 
	  , which is nearly proportional in W .
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Finally, the lottery buyer may or may not take into account that his prize may bear interest at 
a rate r when deposited in a savings account. Given these assumptions, the value A of the 
lottery is found by equating the utility value without buying a ticket to the expected value 
when buying a ticket. We have
      
     
0
0
1 .
t t r tA
t t
e u y dt e u y e p t Z dt
e u y dt e u y dt

  


 




  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 (5) 
It follows that the value of A also depends on the spending pattern  p t  according to which 
the prize is spent over time. If we assume that the consumption pattern for the windfall gain 
can be chosen at will, there will be an optimal spending pattern  pˆ t . Then, the value A of
the lottery is found from the equation 
    
 
   
   
1
0
0
(1 )
= max ( )
ˆ ( ) ,
A
r
p
r
e u y u y
e e u y e p Z u y
e e u y e p Z u y d


  
  
  
  


 

 
  
  
   



d

 (6) 
where t    denotes time, with the draw of the lottery taken as the origin. This equation 
basically says that the utility loss associated with the payment of the lottery ticket should 
equal the expected future gains from it. We can derive the optimum pattern  pˆ t  of how the 
prize  should be spent over future periods from the Euler condition for this problem. This is 
given by 
Z
, , (7)  ˆ( )r re u y e p Z e Z C        0 
where C  stands for a constant. This equation and the constraints in (4) imply the optimal 
spending pattern
       , (8)  ˆ
0
B rce e
p
 
 
    
if
if
max
max
0 T
T


 


with rB r
  , 0yZ  
 , and an unknown constant, c . The spending path is 
decreasing and intersects the horizontal axis in finite time . This point is endogenously 
determined and depends on B , which measures the psychological tradeoff between 
diminishing instantaneous utility and delay, the ‘relative prize’ 
maxT
1 0Zy  
 , and the 
(monthly) interest rate r . Hence, the winnings only affect a finite period . This is a 
key difference with both previous models that can be viewed as having  and 
, respectively. In appendix A we present more details about the determination of 
the unknown constants c  and T  that pin down the optimal path. 
max0,T 
maxT  
max 1T 
max
In order to get some idea of how  varies with the three parameters, we present Table 1. 
We see that  increases with the relative prize. For instance, let us consider an individual 
with a monthly income of € 2000 with   equal to 2 , a time discount of  (per month), 
maxT
maxT
 2%
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and an interest rate  per year, that is  per month. Consequently, his B  is 
calculated to be 0.012 . The spending period of a prize of one hundred times his monthly 
income, that is € 200,000, will be 134 months, that is, approximately 11 years. Notice that for 
most configurations the spending period will be fairly short. The prize is then considered as a 
windfall profit, to be consumed almost immediately. 
4%r  0.32%
Table 1:  for different preferences and different relative prizes maxT
0%r 
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
100 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 
10 0.69 0.47 0.26 0.11 0.04 
1 4.66 2.61 1.15 0.42 0.14 
0.1 26.11 11.46 4.16 1.38 0.44 
B
0.01 114.6 41.62 11.82 4.44 1.41 
0.32%r 
0.01 0.1 1 10 100
100 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.01 
10 0.69 0.47 0.26 0.11 0.04 
1 4.68 2.62 1.15 0.42 0.14 
0.1 26.90 11.75 4.25 1.41 0.45 
B
0.01 153.7 52.74 17.07 5.44 1.72 
From calculations with a variety of realistic interest rates, we found that the effect of r on 
is negligible for small prizes and reasonable ratios . Intuitively, a higher interest 
rate affects consumption smoothing behavior only when the (relative) prize is very large or 
when an individual is very patient or risk averse (which makes consumption smoothing more 
attractive).
maxT / 
Now that we know the optimal spending path, it is possible to evaluate the first part of the 
integral in (6) and subsequently determine the value of the lottery A . More precisely, we 
have
 , ; , , , ,A A y Z r    . (9) 
An explicit analytical expression cannot be given (see appendix B for more details). 
Nevertheless, the question arises whether it would be possible to derive information on 
and  from equation  (9). More precisely, let us assume an individual characterized by a 
specific  combination, where  is known. If we offer this individual two 
different lotteries with different payoff dates, say 
n
 , ; ,n n n ny r   nr
, ,i i iZ  , and ask for the 
reservation prices   of both lotteries, it will be possible to derive the values 
 1,2i  
1 2,n nA A
 ,n n   from his answers  by solving the system inA
, . (10)  , ; , , , ,in n n n in in in nA A y Z r     1,2i 
Indeed (10) is a system of two equations in  ,n n  . It stands to reason that the system is 
highly non-linear. Nevertheless, the two unknown parameters are identifiable. 
4. The data 
The data source used for the empirical analysis is the NIPO Post Initial Schooling Survey that 
was administered by TNS NIPO, a Dutch (commercial) market research company, in 
December 2005. It is the third in a series of surveys jointly commissioned by the project 
group SCHOLAR of the Faculty of Economics and the Max Goote Centre, both of the 
University of Amsterdam, focusing on issues of educational attainment of employed 
individuals. Unlike the previous surveys, where individuals where contacted by phone, the 
2005 sample was obtained using an internet-questionnaire. Apart from a cost reduction, 
internet-based surveys make randomization of questions relatively easy, a feature that was 
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used to obtain more variation in the data. TNS NIPO has a large database of about 200,000 
people who have indicated that they are willing to take part in TNS questionnaires. Because a 
large amount of background characteristics of these respondents is readily available, it is 
possible to focus on specific groups in the population (i.e. to draw a random sample 
conditional on these characteristics). As the NIPO Post Initial Schooling Survey focuses 
mainly on education of working individuals, a random sample of just over three thousand 
( ) employed individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 was drawn. 3026N 
Although the sample is a good reflection of the Dutch working population, it is, by 
construction, not representative for the population as a whole. This is not a major problem 
since there is sufficient heterogeneity in the sample to make it suitable for econometric 
analysis of the relationship between most variables. Whether the sample is selective with 
respect to our variables of interest, risk and time preferences, is hard to say since we have no 
out-of-sample statistics on these variables to compare with. The response to NIPO 
questionnaires is generally very high, however, because respondents have already indicated a 
willingness to cooperate. Hence, we assume that our results will not be dramatically affected 
by self–selection of participation in the survey. Whether the results also hold for unemployed
is an open question that can only be resolved by using additional data. Using weights we can 
make the sample more representative for the total population with respect to the dimensions 
of age, income, and education. Finally, regarding the accuracy of the data, we should keep in 
mind that most respondents will not have spent too much time on answering the questions, 
given the overall size of the questionnaire. Consequently, for some questions there may be a 
considerable random error in the answers. 
The questionnaire consisted of 70 questions focusing mainly on education and educational 
attainment while being employed. The question module on which we are concentrating for 
this paper is that of the lottery-questions, posed at the end of the survey.10 This module runs 
as follows. 
Question 70 – i
Suppose that a lottery ticket is offered to you for a lottery in which  people 
participate (so you have a chance of 1 in  that you will win). The prize is a 
money amount equal to € . The draw of the lottery will be in  months, but 
you will have to buy the ticket now in order to participate. What is the maximum 
amount you are willing to pay for the ticket? €….. 
iN
iN
iZ i
Each respondent was confronted with six ( ) of these questions, where the 
parameter-triplets 
1,...,6i 
 , ,i i iN Z   were randomly and independently drawn from discrete 
distributions with ,
and . No individual was given the same question twice. That is, per individual 
the parameter-triplet 
 100,10,5,4,3,2iN  {1000,3000,5000,10000,50000,1000000}iZ 
1,3,12i  
 , ,i i iN Z   was drawn without replacement. The six lotteries differ 
with respect to the chances of winning, , which are an element of ip  1 1 1 1 1 15100 10 4 3 2, , , , , , with 
respect to the size of the prize Z , and also with respect to the time delay between the 
payment of the lottery ticket and the draw of the prize,  . This randomization gives a lot of 
variation, both between and within subjects, and allows for the estimation of our parameters 
of interest, risk aversion and time preference. All 3026 subjects in the sample answered the 
six lottery questions that were posed to them, but 626 of them did not show any variation in 
their answers, which is likely due to a lack of interest or to misunderstanding of the lottery 
10 € 1 was equivalent to about $1.26 at the moment (2006) of surveying. 
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1832
6 6 3 108  
question.11 We dropped these individuals from the sample, together with those who did not 
state their income. A total of N  individuals and 10992  usable answers remain, 
spread randomly over the  different questions. This gives rise to an average of 
about 102 answers for each lottery. Summary statistics of the answers are given in table 2. 
11 This amount of non-response is quite common in large scale-hypothetical questions on risky choices, where 
subjects have to perform a matching task that is cognitively quite demanding. For instance, Guiso and Paiella 
(2006) and Dohmen et al. (2006) were forced to drop 57% and 61% of their observations, respectively. 
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The table shows the great diversity in the proposed lotteries, with expected values ranging 
from just € 10 to € 500,000. Some of these fall within the range of Dutch popular lotteries 
(LOTTO, State Lottery) that are likely to be the frame of reference for most of our 
respondents. These lotteries typically have a very large prize and a very low probability of 
winning, with an expected value well below € 100.12 Most of the lotteries proposed in the 
table however, have a higher probability of success and consequently also a higher 
mathematical expectation. 
The statistics of the answers given to the various questions reveal three things: (1) both the 
mean and the median answers demonstrate very high risk aversion, with the level of risk 
aversion (defined as the fraction of the lottery expectation that individuals are willing to pay 
for it) increasing with the size of the prize, (2) the mean and average answers show an 
increasing pattern in both chances and monetary outcomes, which means that the average 
person behaves rationally in the sense that he complies with first order stochastic dominance; 
the results for discounting appear more mixed, and (3) there is considerable variation in the 
answers, which is a first indication of heterogeneity in preferences. 
The first finding, that of high risk aversion, is not uncommon with hypothetical questions 
on the willingness to pay for simple lotteries. For instance, using similar hypothetical 
questionnaires Guiso and Paiella (2006) and Hartog et al. (2002) find average willingness to 
pay of 36% and 20% respectively. In another study Dohmen et al. (2006) find that 60% of 
subjects are not willing to invest anything in a hypothetical asset yielding a 200% or 50% 
return with equal probability, when given an initial endowment of € 100,000. This again 
points to high risk aversion, even when there are no potential losses. At first glance the high 
levels of risk aversion found in these studies may appear unrealistic; one might think that if 
the subjects were presented with the same choice in reality, they might display less risk 
aversion. Both Guiso and Paiella and Dohmen et al. show, however, that the obtained risk 
aversion measure has significant explanatory power in predicting risky behaviors, which 
suggests that simple lottery questions do provide reliable information about risk attitudes. 
Moreover, Dohmen et al. validate the answers of the simple lottery question by relating them 
to the choices made in a risk aversion experiment using real incentives and find that both 
responses correlate well. Also, there is evidence that real incentives do not affect mean results 
in simple choice tasks, but simply make responses more noisy (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). 
Finally, if individuals have an inclination not to reveal their true value, this so called 
hypothetical bias is generally found to be positive (List and Gallet, 2001), that is, in the 
direction of overestimation. In our case, this would imply more risk aversion when real 
incentives are used, an effect that has also been found in choice experiments with risky 
prospects (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002, 2005). Given that subjects’ responses to the survey 
questions are already quite conservative, we suspect that such an effect is unlikely in our 
case.
Although we are unaware of studies that show a hypothetical bias in the direction of more 
risk aversion, some observations suggest this could be the case here. In particular, the finding 
that the median person does not want to spend more than a hundred euros on a lottery 
yielding a million euros in a month with 50% probability suggests that people may simply 
think in terms of € 10 to € 100 to spend on a lottery. It is unlikely that this is driven by 
liquidity constraints, but it could be explained by the supposed familiarity of the respondents 
with popular lotteries. Without any learning opportunity, the choice heuristic adopted may be 
that of buying a “normal” lottery ticket. The discovered preference hypothesis says that, 
12 The Dutch National State Lottery, for instance, with a monthly clientele of 3.5 million tickets, sold at a 
price of €13.50 in an adult population of about 13 million, offers a chance of success of about 1 in 10 million, 
with a prize between 1 and 10 million. An interesting comparison of the Dutch popular lotteries has been 
published in the January 2003-issue of the Dutch consumer monthly De Consumentengids. 
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when given an opportunity to learn, individuals will discover their true preferences and act 
upon them (Plott, 1996). This would probably yield less risk aversion in our case. Hence, we 
conjecture that what we measure is an estimate of single shot risk attitudes without any 
learning opportunities. Interestingly however, higher educated individuals, who can be 
expected to act upon their true preferences with fewer learning opportunities, show the same 
median values. 
The second notable feature of table 2 is that the median answers are mostly (weakly) 
increasing in both chance and money outcomes. This principle is violated only four times for 
outcomes and six times for probabilities, and it is an indication that people comply with 
dominance. The results with respect to discounting appear more mixed, with some later dated 
prizes valued less and others higher. At the individual level, consistency can be tested by 
comparing the willingness to pay for pairs of lotteries where one dominates the other. If we 
have two lotteries L1 = 1 1 1( , , )p Z   and L2 = 2 2 2( , , )p Z   with 1 2p p , 1 2Z Z  and 1 2  ,
then we call L1 (weakly) dominated by L2. Because the lotteries were drawn andomly, the 
number of within-individual lottery pairs where one lottery dominates the other differs 
between respondents. For the whole sample (N=3026), thus including individuals who did 
not report their income or showed no variation in their answers, there are, on average, 6.22 
possible comparisons per individual. Of these, 94,5% comply with the dominance 
prediction.13 This rate of consistency is very high, suggesting that the subjects took the 
questions seriously and thought them through, which strengthens the case that what we find 
are unbiased answers in a context without learning. It also suggests that the mixed pattern 
with respect to the time delay observed in the median data is due to individual heterogeneity. 
The final observation that can be made from the table is that there is considerable 
variability in the answers. This can have two causes: (1) between-subject variation, caused by 
heterogeneity in preferences and (2) within-subject random error (Hey, 2005). Both sources 
of variation have received considerable attention in the literature, but for different reasons. 
The first strand of literature is aimed at explaining and predicting risk attitudes (Barsky et al., 
1997; Harrison et al., 2005), while the second has focused on the implications of different 
error specifications on statistical inference and model comparison (Carbone and Hey, 2000; 
Loomes, 2005).14 The present study falls within the first class of articles. In section 5 we will 
analyze whether there is structural variation in the answers that can be explained by 
background characteristics. 
5. The estimation procedure and first results 
The answers that are given by the respondent to the lottery questions  may 
thus be seen as the respondent’s solutions to the above equation 
iA
6
1{( , , )}i i i iZ  
(6). With six lottery 
questions we have, in principle, six solutions  for each respondent n. Given that we have 
more than two observations per individual, we are not in the situation of equation system 
inA
(10)
where we have only two equations that exactly identify the parameters  ,n n  . It is obvious 
that there will not be an exact solution to the system in this case, so we add an i.i.d. normally 
distributed error term  0,in nN  	
N
 to the model. This gives the non-linear model 
, , . (11)  ln ln , ; , , , ,in n n n i in in n inA A y Z r       1,...,6i  1,...,n 
13 The proposed consistency test gives a rough indication of individual rationality. See Choi et al. (2006) for a 
more elaborate test for consistency at the individual level. 
14 Only more recently have authors used within individual randomness to explain observed violations of EU 
(Schmidt and Hey, 2004; Blavatskyy, 2007). 
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We may consider (11) as consisting of  systems of six non-linear equations in the 
unknowns
N
 ,n n  , where the  stand for the observed responses to the lottery questions 
and the unit of time is one month. The parameters 
inA
 ,n n   could be estimated for all 
 separately. These estimates will not be very precise, however, because the 
number of observations per individual is at most six. Also, estimators of non-linear models 
are, in general, not unbiased for small samples. Assuming homogeneity in preferences (i.e. 
1,...,n  N
   ,n n    , ) decreases the number of parameters dramatically, which makes the use of 
asymptotic theory more appropriate. We specify the log-likelihood of the model by 
 
26
1 1
2 2
1 1
ln
, ln2 ln
N
in
n i
a
   	
	 
  !      !  !  !" #
$$ , (12) 
with  ln ln ln , ; , , , ,in in n i in ina A A y Z     r . Because we cannot observe the interest 
rate on savings, we estimate the model for different interest rates, ranging from 0 to 4% per 
year. Estimation of the parameters  ,   by means of maximum likelihood is 
straightforward.15 The results are presented in table 3, together with estimates of relative risk 
aversion for the immediate- and the standard-model.16
Table 3: Estimated preference parameters
Immediate
case (R=y)
Intermediate case Standard 
model 
(R=W)
r 4% 0 % 1 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 
 2.10*** 81.71*** 81.73*** 81.77*** 81.84*** 81.95*** 338.4***
(0.002) (4.219) (4.223) (4.234) (4.254) (4.283) (0.050) 
 0.0603*** 0.0603*** 0.0602*** 0.0602*** 0.0601***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
	 2.640*** 1.767*** 1.767*** 1.767*** 1.767*** 1.767*** 2.807***
(0.028) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) 
N 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 
 -19544.1 -16262.7 -16262.7 -16262.6 -16262.6 -16262.6 -20045.9 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The models are presented from left to right in increasing order of intertemporal flexibility. 
The first column reports the most constraining model, where present income equals present 
consumption, followed by the intermediate model where saving is allowed, given various 
assumed interest rates. The last column reports estimates of the standard model, where the 
lottery is integrated into lifetime wealth and consumption is spread over the entire lifetime. 
The table shows that the results for the intermediate case are insensitive to the choice of the 
interest rate. This is due to the fact that the estimated discount rate is higher by an order of 
magnitude. For convenience we take r = 4%, which is close to the rate of interest on 
government bonds in the Netherlands. 
For the immediate model we find a moderate degree of risk aversion equal to 2, an estimate 
that seems to be most prevalent in the macroeconomic literature (Bliss and Panigirtzoblou, 
2004). Within this strand of literature, however, outcomes are taken in terms of wealth, as in 
r
15 Robust standard errors were calculated correcting for within-subject correlations in the answers due to 
possible unobserved heterogeneity by using Stata’s clustering option. 
16 Lifetime wealth is calculated as the present value of the income stream, . Likewise, the lottery 
prize is taken at present value (i.e. ex ).
/W y
p( )r Z
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the standard model. The risk aversion that we find in that case is higher by two orders of 
magnitude (i.e. 338). This result is similar to that of Schechter (2007) and it corresponds to 
Rabin and Thaler (2002) who note that the small-stake risk aversion that is found in the 
experimental literature (for example Holt and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al. 2005) would 
translate into extreme values of relative risk aversion if integrated with wealth. The estimated 
risk aversion for the intermediate model, where the level of asset integration is endogenously 
determined, falls between the two extremes. The estimate of  is high compared to the 
usual experimental estimates, but much lower than the estimates suggested by the ‘standard 
model’. With the small prizes that are usually involved in the experimental literature, it may 
be argued that consumption is immediate, justifying the neglect of lifetime wealth. With 
larger stakes however, such as the ones applied here, consumption will not be immediate but 
spread over time. This increases the estimated level of relative risk aversion towards (but still 
short of) that of the standard model. This shows that we can obtain lower, more reasonable 
estimates of risk aversion than those implied by the standard model while retaining the 
plausible assumption that consumption is not immediate. The estimates of the intermediate 
model are sensitive to the assumptions made with respect to the baseline income profile and 
the precise form of liquidity constraints. The qualitative conclusion, however, that a model 
with borrowing constraints yields estimates between the two extreme cases, holds in general. 
ˆ 82 
The estimated rate of time preference of  per month is high, but falls within the 
range of values that have been found in the empirical literature. As our questions include a 
tradeoff between the immediate present and the future, the estimated discount rate includes 
preferences for immediate gratification. These preferences have been found to be strong 
compared to those of delayed rewards, yielding discount rates of a hundred or even a 
thousand percent (Frederick et al., 2002). This phenomenon has led researchers to formulate 
different models of time preferences that allow the discount rate to vary with time (Laibson, 
1997; Read, 2001). We employ the simple exponential discounting model because we want to 
show how risk and time preferences interact in the standard model under different 
assumptions. Hence, we need to qualify our rate of time preference as including preferences 
for the present that have been found to be strong. 
ˆ 6% 
The large variation in the answers that is observed in table 2 is captured by the estimated 
standard deviation of the error process, . Indeed there appears to be much variation 
which is not explained by the model. Fortunately, the estimated standard errors of the 
parameters, that are robust to individual heterogeneity, are quite small due to the large sample 
size and variation in ( . Some of the unexplained variation may be due to 
heterogeneity in preferences. Hence, in the next section we will parameterize risk and time 
preferences by a linear combination of individual characteristics.
ˆ 1.76	 
, , )Z 
6. Explanations by assuming heterogeneity 
In this section we attempt to explain the individual parameters  ,n n   by means of some 
independent variables (for other examples of studies that relate risk and/or time preferences 
to individual characteristics see Binswanger 1980; Pålsson, 1996; Barsky et al., 1997; Coller 
and Williams, 1999; Donkers and van Soest, 1999; Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Donkers et 
al., 2001; Harrison et al., 2002; Hartog et al., 2002; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2002; 2003; 
Harrisson et al., 2005; Tu, 2005; Dohmen et al., 2006).17 To allow for heterogeneity in 
17 There are also studies that reverse the relation and view risk and time preferences as explanatory variables 
for different kind of behaviors. For instance Wärneryd (1996) and Guiso and Paiella (2006) try to explain 
portfolio holdings by a measure of risk aversion, while Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) try to explain obesity by 
people’s level of impatience. Kapteyn and Teppa (2002), Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers and van Soest (1999) 
and Dohmen et al. (2006) apply both approaches to risk attitudes, disentangling risk aversion by background 
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preferences, we parameterize the preference parameters by    , ,, ,n n n n        x x .
The log-likelihood of the model then becomes 
 
26
1 1
2 2
1 1
ln
, ln2 ln
N
in
n i
a
   	 	 
  !       !  !  !" #
$$   , (13) 
with  , ,ln ln ln , ; , , , , 4%in in n n n i in ina A A y Z         x x . Estimation of the 
parameters  ,     by maximum likelihood is, again, straightforward. 
Demographic variables that can be thought to be exogenous in this model are the 
respondent's gender (Male, a dummy equal to 1) and age (Age). Males are expected to be less 
risk-averse than females, which is one of the most consistent findings in the literature on 
heterogeneity in risk attitudes (see Charness and Gneezy, 2007, for a recent investigation into 
this issue). The results with respect to time preferences vary, but studies that report a 
significant effect find women to be more patient than men when making decisions between 
sooner smaller and later larger rewards (Coller and Williams, 1999; Donkers and van Soest, 
1999; Read and Read, 2004; Tu, 2005). 
The effect of age (Age) on risk attitudes has not been the main point of focus of any study, 
but this variable has been included in most of the above-mentioned analyses. Risk aversion is 
generally found to be either increasing or U-shaped in age (Pålsson, 1996; Donkers and van 
Soest, 1999; Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001; Hartog et al., 2002). It is unclear whether this is a 
cohort effect or a pure age effect since none of these studies exploits panel data, which would 
enable the separation of the two effects. With respect to the time discount rate, we observe 
that with aging the remaining lifetime shortens. This would suggest a shrinking time horizon 
and hence stronger time discounting.18 This effect is indeed found in most studies (Trostel 
and Taylor, 2001; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2003; Read and Read, 2004; Harrison et al., 2002), 
although some studies also find young individuals to be more impatient, attributed to a lack 
of self-control. 
Other socio-economic and behavioral variables are potentially endogenous such that their 
coefficients should be interpreted as a measure of association useful for detecting individual 
heterogeneity and for prediction, but not for causal inference. For instance education (Edu),
measured as the number of years spent on regular education, can reduce attitudes towards 
risks because individuals with more schooling are better able to judge the risks they are 
facing. On the other hand, schooling attainment can be seen as a risky investment, which will 
cause risk- neutral individuals to select themselves into higher education, assuming that wage 
dispersion is higher (Hartog et al., 2004). Both effects imply a negative relation between risk-
aversion and the level of schooling, but with a different direction of causality. For both 
reasons we expect that more educated people are less risk-averse, an effect that is found in 
most studies (Donkers et al., 2001; Hartog et al., 2002; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2002; Dohmen et 
al., 2006), but certainly not in all (Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001, and Harrison et al., 2005, find 
the opposite). Similarly, education is a long-term investment and such a long-term investment 
is triggered by a long time horizon. Hence, we expect that more education goes hand-in-hand 
with a lower discount rate (Harrison et al., 2002; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2003).
It was already hypothesized by Arrow (1965) and van Praag (1971) that absolute risk 
premia are decreasing with wealth (the hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
(DARA)) because the same monetary risk becomes relatively less important when wealth 
characteristics and using the risk aversion measure as an explanatory variable in portfolio holdings, home 
ownership or risky behaviors.  
18 A more theoretical reasoning is given by Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Trostel and Taylor (2001). 
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increases. There is no a priori reason why relative risk premiums, that are closely linked to 
relative risk aversion, should be increasing (IRRA) or decreasing (DRRA) with wealth, and 
the empirical evidence seems to support neither hypothesis (Gollier, 2001; Halek and 
Eisenhauer, 2001). Hence we are agnostic about the sign of the coefficient of monthly income 
y (measured in euros), which we take as proxy for wealth. The results with respect to time 
preferences also vary, but most studies that report a significant effect find impatience to 
decrease with income (Pender, 1996; Kapteyn and Teppa, 2003; Read and Read, 2004). 
Liquidity constraints may provide a reason for this, individuals with a larger income tend to 
be wealthier and can ‘afford’ to wait. 
Since our sample consists of employed individuals only, we cannot test whether workers 
and non-workers have different risk and time preferences. The respondents in the sample do 
differ in the type of employment they have. Some interesting work-related variables are 
whether someone is a government employee or an entrepreneur. The former group is 
typically thought to have a higher risk aversion (Hartog et al., 2002), whereas the latter group 
is thought to be more inclined to take risks (Cramer et al., 2002). We hypothesize that 
entrepreneurs are more forward- looking, since these individuals typically undertake large 
investments that entail (expected) returns in the future. 
Religion is also a way to cope with the risks of life. Accepting religious rules gives a 
feeling of safety and security. Hence, we expect religion to be positively associated with risk 
aversion. Moreover, religious individuals are hypothesized to be more forward-looking 
(Becker and Mulligan, 1997). We included a measure of religiousness, which varies over five 
categories, where 1 stands for non-religious and 5 for very religious. 
Other demographic variables that are often related to risk and time preferences are whether 
the respondent is married, has children, lives in a small or large community, or belongs to an 
ethnic minority. No robust differences in preference parameters appear to have been found in 
this domain. Behavioural variables of an economic nature that are likely to be related to 
attitudes towards time delay and risk are whether someone buys insurance, plays the lotto, 
has savings, or possesses risky assets. Papers that investigate this mostly find the expected 
relations, albeit often not significant (Wärneryd, 1996; Barsky et al., 1997; Guiso and Paiella, 
2006; Dohmen et al., 2006). 
There has been some research on the relation between time preferences and unhealthy 
behaviours such as smoking, drinking, overeating and using drugs (see for instance Fuchs, 
1991; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Komlos et al., 2003; Picone et al., 2004; Borghans and 
Golsteyn, 2006). These studies view unhealthy behaviors, and consequently health, as a 
decision outcome, dependent on either risk or time preferences. Fuchs for instance, argues 
that impatient individuals have a shorter time horizon and, hence, do not think about the 
future consequences of unhealthy behaviors. We included several behavioral variables such 
as smoking, drinking and being overweight (measured by the Body Mass Index (BMI)). The 
estimates are presented in table 4. 
Table 4: Maximum-likelihood estimates 
Summary 
statsa coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
ln mean s.d.
Male 0.58 0.49 -0.677** (0.270) -0.715** (0.284) -0.705** (0.326)
ln(Age) 39.14 10.54 -0.921 (0.571) -0.844 (0.581) -0.637 (0.845)
ln(Edu+1) 12.75 2.62 -0.822*** (0.316) -0.816** (0.324) -0.885** (0.404)
ln(y) 2127 1189 0.952*** (0.130) 0.988*** (0.132) 0.991*** (0.130)
Religionb 2.49 1.74 0.208 (0.205) 0.227 (0.221) 0.258 (0.197)
Entrepreneur 0.03 0.18 1.783*** (0.613) 1.790*** (0.619) 1.820*** (0.675)
Ln(BMI) 25.53 3.91 2.852** (1.282) 2.792** (1.305) 2.732** (1.066)
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Constant -5.910 (5.188) -6.180 (4.893) -6.179 (4.836)
Demo. Controls  No Yes Yes
Beh. Controls No No Yes
ln 	
Male 0.58 0.49 0.599* (0.309) 0.645* (0.331) 0.661* (0.395)
ln(Age) 39.14 10.54 1.34** (0.641) 1.245* (0.648) 1.049 (0.979)
ln(Edu+1) 12.75 2.62 0.592 (0.463) 0.595 (0.481) 0.722 (0.606)
ln(y) 2127 1189 -.258* (0.139) -0.297** (0.140) -0.277** (0.138)
Religionb 2.49 1.74 -.220 (0.250) -0.251 (0.275) -0.281 (0.251)
Entrepreneur 0.03 0.18 -3.445* (1.790) -3.434* (1.814) -3.529 (2.175)
Ln(BMI) 25.53 3.91 -2.420 (1.669) -2.337 (1.708) -2.436* (1.420)
Constant 0.014 (6.393) 0.195 (6.089) 0.566 (6.058)
Demo. Variables No Yes Yes
Beh. Variables No No Yes

 1.692*** (0.022) 1.691*** (0.022) 1.687*** (0.022)
 -15463 -15450 -15437 
N 1767 1767 1767 
a: Summary statistics of untransformed variables. 
b: This ordinal variable has been mapped on the real axis using a monotonic transformation 
described by van Praag et al. (2003). 
Note: Calculated standard errors robust to unobserved heterogeneity. Significance levels: *: 10%; 
**: 5%; ***: 1%. 
We see that most coefficients have the expected sign, but not all are statistically significant. 
Most of the demographic and behavioral variables are not significant and are, therefore, not 
reported in the table. The coefficients, reported in the second and third column of point 
estimates, are subject to control for these covariates. 
One of the most robust effects found in the empirical literature, the difference in risk 
aversion between males and females, is also found in our dataset; that is, males are much less 
risk-averse than females. The gender effect on time discounting is also strong in magnitude, 
woman being more patient, but this eff ct is only marginally significant. Growing older is 
associated with a lower degree of risk aversion, contrary to what is usually found, but this 
effect is not significant. A higher age is also associated with a higher level of impatience, 
consistent with previous evidence. Using dummies for age classes did not reveal a non-
monotonic relation, hence there does not appear to be a U-shaped pattern in our data. 
A higher level of schooling of the respondent is associated with a lower risk aversion and a 
lower patience level. The latter effect is not as predicted, but insignificant. The estimated 
coefficient of relative risk aversion increases with income, which means that as wealth 
increases, gambles proportional to wealth become less attractive. Impatience is associated 
with a lower income level, consistent with what is mostly found, but this result is not 
significant.
The intensity of being religious has no significant effect on either parameter, but the signs 
are as expected. Entrepreneurs display more utility curvature than employees, which is 
surprising since they are generally thought to be more risk tolerant. Background risk may be 
an explanation for this result; it could be that entrepreneurs are more risk averse because they 
generally face more uncertainty in their income than employees. Halek and Eisenhauer 
(2001) report the same effect. Entrepreneurs are found to be more patient, which is what we 
expected. We did not find an effect for other types of employment. Finally, obesity (being 
over weight) reduces the willingness to take risks, which is also what Dohmen et al. (2006) 
find, and increases the subject's time horizon. This last result is insignificant and contrasts 
with the hypotheses of Komlos et al. (2003), who argue that impatience could lead to over-
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eating and consequently being obese, but the empirical robustness of this effect has yet to be 
established (Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006). 
Clearly our findings correspond to most of the hypotheses and fit in well with the existing 
literature, except for the negative effect of age and the positive effect of entrepreneurship on 
risk aversion. It must be noted, however, that apart from the gender effect on risk aversion, 
there do not appear to be many other robust empirical findings in the literature that explain 
risk and/or time preferences. That is, there is variation across studies in the sign and 
significance of the estimated effect of most variables. Figure 1 plots the predicted preference 
parameters. Both distributions have a log-normal shape. The peak at  near zero is caused by 
the group of entrepreneurs that have a significantly higher time horizon.  
ˆ
Figure 1: Histogram of predicted parameters. 
 (a) Histogram of . (b) Histogram of .ˆ ˆ
7. Summary and conclusions
This paper starts from the basic premise that many economic decision problems have both a 
risk and a time dimension. This was illustrated in the context of the valuation of simple 
lotteries. Traditionally, behavior in this context is modeled by looking at the risk dimension 
of decisions, neglecting the fact that the evaluation of the prize not only depends on the 
absolute amount of the prize, but also on the way in which the prize is spent over time. To 
illustrate how, in this context, the standard model can be extended to accommodate the 
additional time dimension, we formulated a simple discounted expected utility model where 
we take account of the opportunity to spread consumption optimally over time, while making 
the plausible assumption that individuals are borrowing constrained. In that case the 
consumption of the prize is spread over a finite period that is endogenously determined and 
depends on time preferences. This model forms an intermediate case between the expected 
utility model defined over wealth (the standard model) and defined over income (the 
immediate model). These models have dominated the literature on the measurement of risk 
aversion for large and small stakes respectively. 
The empirical tractability of the model was shown by simultaneously estimating the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and the subjective time discount rate, using a sample of 
1,832 subjects who were asked to state their willingness to pay for six different, randomly 
assigned lotteries. Most of the answers were consistent, with 94.5% of all possible within-
subject comparisons complying with dominance and discounting. This suggests that, even 
though we did not provide monetary incentives, the subjects took the questions seriously. 
The average coefficient of relative risk aversion was estimated to be 82. While this 
estimate is high compared to what is usually reported, it falls between the estimates of the 
usual models. If consumption is assumed to be immediate, the inferred relative risk aversion 

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is 2, while we find an estimate of 338 if full asset integration is assumed. This shows that we 
get lower, more reasonable estimates of risk aversion than those implied by the standard 
model if we assume that individuals are borrowing constrained, while retaining the plausible 
assumption that consumption is not immediate. The subjective time discount rate was 
estimated at 6% per month on average, which is high but falls within the range of values that 
has been found. The quantitative values of these estimates depend on the assumptions made 
about baseline consumption, the timing of the lottery, and the exact form of the liquidity 
constraints, but the quantitative conclusion hold in general. 
Both  and   appeared to vary strongly over individuals. This variation could be 
explained by income, age, gender and entrepreneurship, consistent with the majority of 
previous evidence. It suggests that the parameters of the model indeed capture preferences 
towards risk and time. 

Our analysis shows that the estimates of relative risk aversion are sensitive to the 
assumptions made about consumption and that it is possible to accommodate for the effects 
of both risk and time dimensions in subject’s decisions when considering simple lotteries. 
This finding generalizes to many other settings, where we may think of risky assets, 
portfolios, and so on. Obviously, this also holds inversely. If we try to estimate subjective 
time discount rates from the evaluation of risky assets over time, we cannot do this without 
simultaneously taking the attitude towards risk into account (see Andersen et al., 2008). We 
hope that this analysis will stimulate researchers of risk attitudes and time preferences to 
consider both the risk and time dimensions simultaneously when analyzing subject’s 
decisions.
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Appendix A: Determination of  max,c T
Dividing the Euler equation (eq. (7)) by that when evaluated at  and rearranging yields 0 
, , (14)     ˆr r u y e p Z ce        0 

       0 

with . Using the CRRA-specification and solving for the optimal profile we get /c C Z
, , (15)  ˆ B rp ce e
with rB r
  , 0yZ  
  and the constant 
1
/c c Z  0

r
 to be determined. We 
note that B  if , irrespective of the value of . Hence, eventually 
 r 
 0r 
  pˆ  
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will become negative, which violates the non-negativity condition. The moment  at 
which this occurs is found by solving the equation 
maxT
    maxmaxˆ 0
B r Tp T c e    %  , (16) 
for . We see that  depends on the unknown c . The additional constraint in maxT maxT (4),
which states that the spending fractions should sum to one, can be used to identify the model. 
Substituting c  from (16) into (8) we may rewrite this as 
, (17) 
max max
max( )
0 0
1
T T
B r T B re e d e d        


from which  and subsequently c  may be solved numericallymaxT 19. An analytical solution 
cannot be given because this equation contains both exponential end linear terms. For 
completeness, we notice that if , then  would start being zero and become 
positive and increasing after . If that were the case, the integral in 
r  pˆ  
maxT (17) would not 
converge. Therefore, we assume .r 

Appendix B: Determination of A
With the optimal profile  fully specified, the maximum of the integral in pˆ   (6) can be 
evaluated. To this end we can use equation (14), the fact that , and the relation  c c Z 
1
1
1
( )u u





 , which holds for a CRRA utility-function u  and its derivative u . This yields 
       
max max
max
1 1
0 0
ˆ( )
1 1
T T
BTr BcZ cZe u y e p Z dt e d e
B
 
    
 
 
     
    1 . (18) 
The willingness to pay A  can be solved from (6) by substitution of this expression. 
19 Equation (17) has two solutions in , but only one root is positive as required. maxT
